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PROGRESSIVE TEXTUALISM IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Kathryn E. Kovacs* 
INTRODUCTION 
Nicholas Bagley’s article The Procedure Fetish is destined to be a classic.1 
In it, Bagley systematically dismantles administrative law’s obsession with 
procedure. He decimates the arguments that procedure is necessary to legit-
imize the administrative state and avoid agency capture. He nullifies the con-
tention that administrative law is neutral by showing how proceduralism 
inhibits regulation and “favors a libertarian agenda over a progressive one.”2 
Bagley urges progressives to abandon “gauzy claims about legitimacy and 
accountability” and approach procedure with skepticism.3 
The Procedure Fetish addresses the normative question of what adminis-
trative law ought to require. Bagley writes about how progressives should 
solve the “optimization problem: [w]hich set of procedures will best balance 
the competing goals of efficiency, the protection of legal rights, and public 
accountability.”4 Bagley does not, however, provide an answer to the ques-
tion of where progressives should find currently binding administrative law. 
The answer is simple: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Progressive 
textualism provides the missing piece for Bagley’s analysis. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. Many thanks to Nick Bagley, Katie Eyer, 
Chris Walker, and Wendy Wagner for assistance in developing this Essay. 
 1. Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2019); see also Jeffrey 
Pojanowski, How to Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Administrative State, JOTWELL 
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://adlaw.jotwell.com/how-to-learn-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-
administrative-state/ [https://perma.cc/7PVG-CYQ2]. 
 2. Bagley, supra note 1, at 364. 
 3. Id. at 369; see also Kathryn E. Kovacs, Getting Agencies Back into the Game, REG. 
REV. (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/10/29/kovacs-getting-agencies-game/ 
[https://perma.cc/5KM4-UDAV] (“The progressive regulatory reform agenda also should fo-
cus on alleviating the burdens that agencies confront when making rules and consider how that 
objective should be balanced against other progressive rulemaking goals.”). 
 4. Bagley, supra note 1, at 352. 
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I. PROGRESSIVE TEXTUALISM 
Textualism in constitutional interpretation was long the province of 
conservatives.5 Now many progressives have embraced textualism.6 Progres-
sive textualists “seek[] to beat conservatives at their own game by insisting 
that arguments about the text, history, and structure of the Constitution of-
ten lead to liberal rather than conservative results.”7 As Katie Eyer observed 
recently, “the textualism revolution has been so successful as to lead even 
prominent progressives to proclaim that ‘we’re all textualists now.’ ”8 
James Ryan’s article Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of 
New Textualism9 synthesized the work of Akhil Reed Amar, Jack M. Balkin, 
and other progressive scholars who embrace the premise that constitutional 
interpretation must start with a determination of what the text of the Consti-
tution means.10 To begin, the Founders’ original expectations “might shed 
some light on the meaning of the text,” but “the meaning of the language 
must control over the expectations of the framers.”11 Unearthing the mean-
 
 5. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
849, 901 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (“[T]extualism has become a conservative brand.”). 
 6. See Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making It Up—“Original Intent” and Fed-
eral Takings Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203, 280 (2003) (“ ‘[P]rogressive textualism’ . . . starts 
with the text and goes from there. It does not endorse abandoning the text in favor of liberal or 
conservative politics, nor does it subject the text to impossible thought processes requiring one 
to resurrect the ghosts of those long dead to obtain answers, nor does it try to glean historical 
truths about the meaning of words in a vacuum without regard to other sources.”). 
 7. Jeffrey Rosen, How New Is the New Textualism?, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 43, 44 
(2013); see also James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textual-
ism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1527 (2011) (“[P]rogressive academics are engaging conservatives on 
their own turf and showing how numerous constitutional provisions are more in line with con-
temporary progressive values than conservative ones.”). 
 8. Katie R. Eyer, Statutory Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 
85 (2019) (quoting Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 
YALE L.J. 788, 793, 793 n.10 (2018) (quoting Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with 
Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today
.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation [https://perma.cc
/4PUQ-JZ57])). Of course, not all progressives have embraced textualism. See, e.g., Rosen, su-
pra note 7, at 48. 
 9. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1524. I am less concerned with whether “textualist” is the 
proper label, see Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625, 625–26, 
626 n.3 (2012) (identifying Ryan and others as “originalist”), than whether Ryan and the other 
scholars he reflects present a methodology that could be helpful in administrative law. 
 10. Ryan, supra note 7. Ryan’s article provided the foundation for the litigation strategy 
of the Constitutional Accountability Center founded by Douglas T. Kendall, which has enjoyed 
many victories in the courts. See Rosen, supra note 7, at 44–46; CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., 
https://www.theusconstitution.org/ [https://perma.cc/WM5F-NN8T]. 
 11. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1540, 1546; see also Eyer, supra note 8, at 89 (“[T]he practice 
of ascertaining the meaning of words at the time of their enactment [is] a well-established stat-
utory interpretation approach.”). 
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ing of the text requires a deeper inquiry.12 Ryan endorses Amar’s “holistic” 
approach, which relies not only on text and structure, but also on history— 
and not just enactment history, but also “the broader historical context sur-
rounding the enactment.”13 In addition, later amendments may “shed light 
on” or even modify the meaning of the original text.14 
While the meaning of the text is the starting point for a progressive tex-
tual analysis,15 even the most exhaustive review of the text’s structure and 
history will not yield a definitive answer to every question.16 Nonetheless, 
text might “narrow the range of possible outcomes.”17 Moreover, the text it-
self “provides guidance regarding the level of generality at which to interpret 
that language.”18 Text that is precise should be interpreted precisely; text that 
is abstract should be interpreted more generally.19 
Progressive textualists recognize that the Constitution “is not frozen in 
time.”20 Additionally, as Katie Eyer explained in the statutory context, “the 
meaning of the words . . . is fixed,” but the application of the text evolves.21 
Underlying the text are general principles, the application of which may 
change.22 Thus, a progressive textual analysis “requires translating the text to 
apply to the present context.”23 History is critical insofar as it elucidates the 
meaning of the text24 and “shed[s] important light on the purposes and prin-
ciples underlying the more general and abstract phrases in the documents.”25 
This is the key to progressive textualism. It’s not just about proving that 
individual provisions yield progressive results. Rather, progressive textual-
ism recognizes that the entire document is progressive in that it is amenable 
 
 12. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1540. 
 13. Id. at 1548. 
 14. Id. at 1548–49; see also id. at 1568. 
 15. Peter Brooks, Essay, Law and Humanities: Two Attempts, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1437, 1450 
(2013) (“What Ryan elsewhere appears to be saying is that progressives as well as conservatives 
need to argue from constitutional text . . . .”). 
 16. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1544–45; see also Ethan J. Ranis, Note, Loose Constraints: The 
Bare Minimum for Solum’s Originalism, 93 TEX. L. REV. 765, 782 (2015) (“Ryan’s proposed lex-
ical order lends the text greater weight but does not give it full control unless it is completely 
specific and determinative.”). 
 17. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1553; see also Brianne J. Gorod, Originalism and Historical 
Practice in Separation-of-Powers Cases, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 41, 52–53 (2016) (“Under 
[Ryan’s] view, text and history is the place to start an inquiry into constitutional meaning, but 
that does not mean that text and history alone can answer every question. Indeed, text and his-
tory often do more to reject certain possible answers than to provide one definitive one.”). 
 18. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1546; see also id. at 1554. 
 19. Id. at 1544. 
 20. Id. at 1539. 
 21. Eyer, supra note 8, at 90; see also Ryan, supra note 7, at 1539. 
 22. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1539, 1546, 1554. 
 23. Id. at 1542. 
 24. Id. at 1548. 
 25. Id. at 1554. 
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to change and has in fact progressed throughout its history.26 The meaning 
of the text and its core principles do not change, but their application does.27 
Progressive textualists reject the idea that the drafters’ expectations fix the 
meaning of the text for all time. Rather, a progressive interpretation studies 
the larger historical context and reads the text in light of current circum-
stances.28 “To show fidelity to the Constitution . . . requires translating the 
meaning of the text to apply to the present context.”29 
Ultimately, Ryan suggests that courts and scholars should follow the 
model of Amar, Balkin, and Seigel by determining the text’s meaning “as 
precisely as possible” before applying the text to the circumstances at issue.30 
They should “linger a little longer than they do now over the text and histo-
ry.”31 He calls on scholars to do the yeoman’s work of “elucidat[ing] the 
meaning of important constitutional provisions that remain shrouded in 
mystery or obscured by current doctrine.”32 An ounce of history, he says, is 
worth a pound of theory.33 
Needless to say, academics continue to debate constitutional interpretive 
methodology. Nonetheless, variants of textual approaches have become 
nearly universal in constitutional law.34 As Sara Solow and Barry Friedman 
observed, “we now see some convergence between the Left’s and the Right’s 
versions of constitutional interpretive theory, albeit one obscured by their 
rhetoric (and differing outcomes, of course).”35 
II. INTERPRETING THE APA 
Progressives should take a parallel approach in administrative law. Even 
if Kevin Stack is generally correct that democratic values and the rule of law 
“suggest that constitutional and statutory interpretation diverge,”36 that is 
not true of the APA. The APA is not a typical statute. It arose from a long 
period of public deliberation and has become deeply entrenched in U.S. law. 
It was written as a constitution for the Fourth Branch, and it has come to 
 
 26. Id. at 1529, 1538–39, 1549. 
 27. Id. at 1539. 
 28. Id. at 1540. 
 29. Id. at 1542. 
 30. Id. at 1560–61. 
 31. Id. at 1561. 
 32. Id. at 1570. 
 33. Id. at 1555 (“[A]n ounce of history is not always worth a pound of theory, but that is 
a pretty typical exchange rate.”). 
 34. Id. at 1552; see also Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives’ Quest to Reclaim the 
Constitution and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1205 (2011) (“[T]he long-running academic 
debate about interpretive methodology appears to have little if any substance left to it.”). 
 35. Sara Aronchick Solow & Barry Friedman, How to Talk About the Constitution, 25 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 69, 73 (2013). 
 36. Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004). 
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function as one.37 For such superstatutes, a more constitutional style of in-
terpretation is appropriate.38 
For too long, administrative law scholars and judges have ignored the 
APA.39 Courts continue to give certain agencies superdeference, even though 
the text and history of the APA show that Congress deliberately chose to 
subject all agencies to the same standard of review.40 Courts continue to ap-
ply common law ripeness doctrine, even though the APA replaced it with the 
final agency action requirement.41 Courts continue to presume that courts 
may review agency action, even though the APA “establishes a default rule 
favoring [judicial] review [only] where no statute precludes it.”42 Courts con-
tinue to hold that the waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA is not con-
strained by the other limitations in the APA, even though the text and 
history show that to be incorrect.43 In informal rulemaking, courts continue 
to require agencies to produce a record, provide notice of the information 
considered in drafting the proposed rule, disclose ex parte communications, 
and write an extensive explanation for the final rule, even though those re-
quirements contradict the text and history of the APA.44 
The acceptance of doctrines that contradict the APA flows from the view 
that the APA codified the common law and left the courts free to continue to 
develop administrative law in a common law fashion.45 The Attorney Gen-
eral’s Manual of 1947 reflected this view, calling the APA a “restatement.”46 
Leading scholars of the time adopted this view as well.47 
 
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 68–71. 
 38. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. 
L.J. 1207, 1222–23, 1250–54 (2015). 
 39. See Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70 
ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 808–09 (2018) (“[L]ike that of the Constitution, the text and history of the 
APA often do not play a role in litigated cases.”); Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1213; Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to Beermann and Lawson, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 906, 908 (2007). 
 40. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583 (2011) 
[hereinafter Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field]; Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the 
Military Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 697 
(2010). 
 41. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 
177 (1998). 
 42. Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1305 (2014). 
 43. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Scalia’s Bargain, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1157–58 (2016). 
 44. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 
70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 534–45 (2018). 
 45. Duffy, supra note 41, at 119, 131. 
 46. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 93 (1947). The Supreme Court has deferred to the AG’s 
Manual. See Kovacs, supra note 44, at 531. 
 47. Duffy, supra note 41, at 134–38. 
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That view, however, is not entirely correct.48 Congress would not have 
spent seventeen years debating administrative reform and the attorney gen-
eral would not have needed to publish a manual on the APA if the statute 
were merely a restatement of the common law.49 The attorney general’s 
characterization of the APA “is best viewed as damage control.”50 The Tru-
man Administration “would have preferred less control of agencies” and 
thus interpreted the new law as a restatement that “impos[ed] limited con-
straints on agencies.”51 Conservatives would have preferred a stricter bill and 
interpreted the new law to favor their position.52 The truth is that some pro-
visions of the APA codified the common law; others were new.53 Some pro-
visions are precise; others are ambiguous.54 The key point here is that the 
text provides far more answers than scholars typically realize. 
It is time for progressive administrative law scholars to claim the APA as 
their own. Conservatives began the push for administrative reform, and 
many provisions of the law reflect conservative concerns.55 The APA, how-
ever, also “reflects the Progressives’ understanding that rigid legal proce-
dures slowed government action and were unnecessary.”56 The APA’s “most 
important reform”57—notice-and-comment rulemaking—was a “Progressive 
innovation.”58 Blake Emerson suggests that “we should give th[e] original 
[progressive] understanding of the administrative state a second look.”59 So 
too should we give the original progressive understanding of the APA a sec-
ond look. 
 
 48. Bernick, supra note 39, at 813 (“[T]here is much in the APA that was genuinely new 
in 1946.”); Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1228 (“[M]any provisions of the APA were new.”). 
 49. Kovacs, supra note 44, at 546; Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1228. 
 50. Duffy, supra note 41, at 133. 
 51. Kovacs, supra note 44, at 531. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1227–28. 
 54. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Pixelating Administrative Common Law in Perez v. Mortgage 
Bankers Association, 125 YALE L.J.F. 31, 34–35 (2015). 
 55. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1649 (1996). 
 56. Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the 
Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 474 (2012). 
 57. George B. Shepherd, supra note 55, at 1583, 1635; see also Symposium, Present at the 
Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 520 (1986). 
 58. Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Le-
gitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2071 (2018). Section 4 of 
the APA followed the recommendation of the conservative minority on the Attorney General’s 
Committee. Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1232–33. Nonetheless, it originated in progressive think-
ing. Emerson, supra at 2081–82. 
 59. Emerson, supra note 58, at 2073. 
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A. Method 
A progressive textualist approach to interpreting the APA begins with 
the text. Indeed, it is particularly important to pay close attention to the text 
of the APA because it was such a “monumental compromise.”60 As John 
Manning explained, failing to focus on a statute’s “implemental detail” risks 
undermining complex legislative bargains.61 The enacting Congress’s expec-
tations may illuminate the meaning of the text, but the language itself must 
control.62 
In addition to analyzing statutory structure, a complete understanding 
of the text requires studying “the full context and history” of each provi-
sion.63 Jerry Mashaw warned that a failure to understand the history of ad-
ministrative law leads to misunderstanding the law now.64 
Lastly, a progressive textualist approach to interpreting the APA re-
quires considering “ongoing deliberation” about the Act, including amend-
ments that have been enacted and those that were defeated following 
significant debate.65 In short, progressive scholars should take the APA’s text 
 
 60. Kovacs, supra note 54, at 33. 
 61. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1304 
(2010). 
 62. Thus, regardless of whether Congress in 1946 expected that the APA would cover 
the president, the plain language of the Act does. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2018); Kathryn E. Ko-
vacs, A Day in the Life of an Administrative Law Nerd, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT 
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://yalejreg.com/nc/a-day-in-the-life-of-an-administrative-law-nerd-by-
kathryn-e-kovacs/ [https://perma.cc/LR2Z-BSPM]. 
 63. Kovacs, supra note 54, at 35. Evan Bernick agrees that “[a]scertaining communica-
tive content requires attention to the context in which a given text took shape,” Bernick, supra 
note 39, at 841, but he cautions against “drawing upon the APA’s pre- and post-enactment his-
tory,” id. at 845. But see Evan Bernick, The Regulatory State and Revolution: How (Fear of) 
Communism Has Shaped Administrative Law, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Aug. 11, 
2019), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-regulatory-state-and-revolution-how-fear-of-communism-
has-shaped-administra-tive-law-by-evan-bernick/ [https://perma.cc/J6SP-NR4Z] (exploring 
how anti-communism shaped the APA). Instead, Bernick posits that interpreting the APA 
“could entail an effort to reconstruct the actual understanding of the text that was held in 1946 
by those to whom it was initially addressed.” Bernick, supra note 39, at 843. As Katie Eyer 
showed, however, the original public meaning approach “has essentially no pedigree in the 
statutory interpretation case law,” “violates core principles of textualism,” and raises rule-of-
law concerns. See Eyer, supra note 8, at 71, 87, 102. Moreover, such an approach is particularly 
awkward as applied to the APA. The APA was addressed to federal agencies. Their view in 
1946 is reflected in the Attorney General’s Manual. But that document is not a fair representa-
tion of the Act’s text or the conservative minority’s interpretation of the text. See Shepherd, 
supra note 55, at 1683 (“No reason exists to give more weight to the Attorney General’s Manual 
than to conservatives’ contrasting interpretations.”). 
 64. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 286 (2012). 
 65. Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1251; Kovacs, supra note 54, at 35. Evan Bernick’s original-
ist approach to the APA, in contrast, would fix the meaning of the text at the time of enact-
ment. Bernick, supra note 39, at 834. 
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as the starting point for analysis and delve deeply into the history and con-
text to discern its meaning before applying it to present circumstances.66 
This textual approach is preferable for many reasons. First, the APA is 
the law.67 It is not just any law, however. Numerous scholars have recognized 
the APA’s quasi-constitutional nature.68 William Eskridge and John Fere-
john theorized that some statutes “successfully penetrate public normative 
and institutional culture in a deep way”69 and become “resistant to 
change.”70 The APA is such a statute; it has become deeply entrenched and 
achieved superstatute status.71 At this point, diluting the APA’s core precepts 
seems out of the question. 
Second, a progressive textual approach in administrative law respects 
the outcome of one of the most remarkable episodes of deliberation in Con-
gress in the twentieth century. The APA developed through an unusual pro-
cess of public deliberation spanning seventeen years, “with numerous, volu-
voluminous reports, hundreds of pages of hearing transcripts, multiple 
drafts, and hours and hours of debate.”72 A textual approach effectuates the 
compromise embodied in the APA’s text. As the Supreme Court said shortly 
after the APA’s enactment: 
 The Act thus represents a long period of study and strife; it settles 
long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon 
 
 66. Jeffrey Pojanowski’s Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2019) (on file with the Michigan Law Review), resembles this approach in some respects. 
He too suggests that “courts should [be] more attentive and faithful” to the APA in “recogni-
tion of the hierarchy of statutory law over judicial doctrine.” Id. (manuscript at 5); see also id. 
(manuscript at 35). Like a progressive textualist, a neoclassicist would begin “by seeking the 
best reading of the APA or the agency’s governing statute, not asking whether common law . . . 
can be reconciled with a colorable reading of such legislation.” Id. (manuscript at 44). Like a 
progressive textualist, a neoclassicist would defer to Congress’s statutory solutions to polycen-
tric problems. Id. (manuscript at 45). Pojanowski, however, is decidedly originalist. See id. 
(manuscript at 34–35, 44). Presumably, Pojanowski would not endorse an inquiry into broad 
historical context or ongoing deliberation to discern the APA’s meaning, apply the text to take 
account of changed circumstances, or allow the text to override “the original understanding” of 
the Act. See id. (manuscript at 25); see also Ryan, supra note 7, at 1552–53 (distinguishing pro-
gressive textualism from originalism). 
 67. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 1539 (“[T]he ultimate justification for following the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution is that the enacted text is a legal document. It is the law and 
universally recognized as such.”). 
 68. E.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Foreword, The American Model of Federal Administrative 
Law: Remembering the First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975, 980 (2010); Alan 
B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 
253, 253 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 363. 
 69. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215 
(2001). 
 70. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 8 (2010); see also id. at 13, 27, 28, 64. 
 71. See Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1223. 
 72. Kovacs, supra note 44, at 546. 
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which opposing social and political forces have come to rest. It contains 
many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some ambiguities. Ex-
perience may reveal defects. But it would be a disservice to our form of 
government and to the administrative process itself if the courts should fail, 
so far as the terms of the Act warrant, to give effect to its remedial purposes 
where the evils it was aimed at appear.73 
A textual approach recognizes that the vision of the Greatest Genera-
tion’s Congress74 should be given a chance. As Eskrijohn established, courts 
should take the “deliberative process seriously, as having significant norma-
tive force.”75 Furthermore, even if we accept the separation-of-powers and 
electoral-accountability concerns with federal common law generally, for 
courts to devalue the extraordinary deliberation reflected in the APA’s text 
exacerbates those concerns.76 
Third, a progressive textual approach acknowledges that courts suffer 
from a “deliberation deficiency” because their consideration is “virtually 
unmoored from public deliberation.”77 Moreover, courts are ill-equipped to 
weigh the pros and cons of administrative requirements or to foresee the 
consequences of their doctrines.78 They hear individual cases involving indi-
vidual agencies and thus do not have the opportunity to consider “varied 
contexts and approaches to solving problems.”79 As Nicholas Bagley demon-
strated, when Congress has balanced “a host of incommensurate values” in a 
statute, “[t]he courts have no constitutional authority to revise that judgment 
and no epistemic basis for thinking they can make a better one.”80 
Finally, progressive textualism in administrative law starts from a uni-
versal premise: that the text of the APA is authoritative.81 Because everyone 
recognizes the authority of the text, this approach provides a common base-
 
 73. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40–41 (1950). 
 74. TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION XXXVIII (2004 ed.) (dubbing the peo-
ple who came of age during World War II “the greatest generation any society has ever pro-
duced”). 
 75. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 70, at 435. 
 76. Kovacs, supra note 44, at 545–46; Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1255–56. 
 77. Kovacs, supra note 38, at 1209, 1257; cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, Embracing 
Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1356 (2012) (“Judicial develop-
ment of administrative law is harder to square with the principle of democratic government if 
the fact that the courts play this lawmaking role is shielded from public acknowledgement and 
scrutiny.”). 
 78. Bagley, supra note 42, at 1322, 1330; cf. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Con-
sequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894, 900 (1936) (“Situations which de-
mand . . . immediate action of some sort, will usually involve ignorance of certain aspects of the 
situation and will bring about unexpected results.”). 
 79. Kovacs, supra note 44, at 546. 
 80. Bagley, supra note 42, at 1330. 
 81. Cf. Ryan, supra note 7, at 1539. 
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line for discussion, “a common language for liberals and conservatives to de-
bate . . . issues in common terms.”82 
This approach will not necessarily lead to conservative outcomes. Alt-
hough conservatives instigated administrative reform,83 the final text, like 
the Constitution, is “hardly conservative.”84 The Walter-Logan bill, which 
President Roosevelt vetoed in 1940,85 would have imposed a panoply of 
strict, conservative requirements on federal agencies.86 By the time President 
Truman signed the APA in 1946, it had been pared down to a basic frame-
work that was designed to establish a uniform baseline for agency deci-
sionmaking and judicial review so that agencies would remain free to fulfill 
their statutory mandates.87 To paraphrase Jeffrey Rosen, progressives should 
frame their arguments about administrative law in APA terms and use the 
APA “as a sword rather than a shield.”88 
Applying a progressive textual approach in administrative law could un-
dercut longstanding common law rules and thus yield potentially disruptive 
consequences. For example, Aaron Nielson showed that the rule of Florida 
East Coast Railway—that formal rulemaking is required only when the sub-
stantive statute requires a hearing “on the record”89—may be inconsistent 
with the text and history of the APA.90 Overturning Florida East Coast Rail-
way would require more formal rulemaking, which certainly would be a big 
change. A change of such magnitude might elicit a response from Congress. 
One of the benefits of a progressive textual approach, then, is that it may 
trigger more deliberation in Congress. 
Congress’s ability to respond to Supreme Court decisions provides the 
foundation for the “strong rule of stare decisis in matters of statutory inter-
pretation.”91 Stare decisis recently inspired the Court in Kisor v. Wilkie not 
 
 82. See Rosen, supra note 7, at 44. 
 83. Kovacs, supra note 44, at 520–21. 
 84. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 1547 (discussing Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Original-
ism: Original Intent for Liberals (and for Conservatives and Moderates, Too), SLATE (Sept. 21, 
2005, 12:36 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/09
/rethinking_originalism.html [https://perma.cc/LA2L-UVV2]). 
 85. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The President Vetoes the Bill Regulating Administrative 
Agencies, Note to the House of Representatives, (Dec. 18, 1940), in 1940 THE PUBLIC PAPERS 
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 616 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941); see also 
Shepherd, supra note 55, at 1625–28. 
 86. H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. (1939); Shepherd, supra note 55, at 1593–94, 1598–1625. 
 87. See generally Shepherd, supra note 55, at 1649–62. 
 88. See Rosen, supra note 7, at 53 (describing how progressive textualists should use the 
text of the Constitution). 
 89. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236 (1973). 
 90. Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 242–53 
(2014). 
 91. Thomas W. Merrill, Interpreting an Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547, 587–
88 (2018); see also Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274 (2014); Randy 
J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 
TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1136–43 (2019). 
144 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 118:134 
to overrule its precedents requiring courts to defer to agency interpretations 
of their own regulations.92 The Court there was particularly concerned about 
overturning a rule that “pervades the whole corpus of administrative law.”93 
Stare decisis, however, will not always prevent change. First, its rationale 
does not extend to the courts of appeals, where much administrative com-
mon law originates.94 Second, it may not apply to more abstract judicial 
rules.95 Third, it does not prevent the Supreme Court from overturning rules 
that are “unworkable” or “doctrinal dinosaur[s].”96 In deciding whether to 
adhere to precedent, the Court considers “ ‘the quality of [its] reasoning, the 
workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related deci-
sions, . . . and reliance on the decision.”97 Even if stare decisis prevents the 
Supreme Court from overturning precedents that conflict with the APA, 
such rulings may inspire Congress to act.98 
Of course, Congress has not meaningfully amended the APA in dec-
ades.99 Congress’s inability to keep the law up to date leads some to celebrate 
the courts’ common law creativity in administrative law.100 As I argued pre-
viously, however, Congress’s dysfunction “does not justify abandoning the 
constitutional design and allowing courts to enable that dysfunction.”101 The 
federal courts’ willingness to reform the APA facilitates Congress’s inac-
tion.102 Instead, the courts should follow Eskrijohn’s advice and use their de-
cisions to “jump-start the political process by forcing a fundamental 
normative discussion.”103 
 
 92. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019). 
 93. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422. 
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 102. Id. at 1258–59. 
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B. Application 
James Ryan posits that “[s]cholarly work that establishes the most plau-
sible reading of a constitutional provision will likely exert more influence, 
both within courts and outside of them, than will sophisticated refinements 
regarding the details of a constitutional theory.”104 If that claim is correct, 
and if it applies to administrative law, the following few examples of textual-
ism in administrative law should be quite influential. Regardless of whether 
the authors of these pieces would characterize themselves as “progressive,” 
their work exemplifies the approach that I urge progressives to adopt.105 
John Duffy’s now-classic Administrative Common Law in Judicial Re-
view explored the history of administrative common law in depth, explaining 
why it survived, and why it should not have survived, the APA’s passage.106 
He employed a holistic, textual approach to explain why exhaustion doctrine 
succumbed to the text of the APA in Darby v. Cisneros107 and to prove that 
“ripeness doctrine has no place in the APA.”108 He analyzed Vermont Yankee 
from a textual perspective,109 concluding that “judicial review of agency pro-
cedural discretion has no basis in the APA.”110 Finally, he discussed how 
Chevron doctrine might be “reconciled with the APA,”111 again delving deep-
ly into the APA’s text and history.112 In conclusion, he called for administra-
tive law scholars to analyze “some of the oldest statutes in the Republic, . . . 
the origins of administrative law, . . . the politics and powers that shaped the 
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APA, and . . . the intellectual movements in federal court theory in this cen-
tury.”113 
Nicholas Bagley adopted a textualist approach to the APA in The Puz-
zling Presumption of Reviewability, where he proved that the presumption 
that agency action is reviewable contradicts the APA’s limitation of judicial 
review to circumstances in which no statute precludes judicial review.114 Af-
ter describing the origins of the modern presumption,115 Bagley did a deep 
dive into the historical, statutory, constitutional, and prudential arguments 
that might support the presumption and found them all wanting.116 After 
that holistic analysis, Bagley explored the costs of the presumption and con-
cluded that “it can impede the proper functioning of the regulatory and ad-
ministrative regimes that Congress has established.”117 
Jack Beermann and Gary Lawson “reprocessed” the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Vermont Yankee and concluded that a number of administrative 
law doctrines contradict a natural understanding of the case.118 Their close 
analysis of Vermont Yankee led them to endorse a textual approach.119 They 
showed how the doctrine regarding ex parte communications during infor-
mal rulemaking,120 the requirement that decisionmakers in rulemaking have 
an open mind,121 and the judicial requirements for notices of proposed 
rulemaking contradict the text of the APA.122 Recently, I added the requisite 
historic and contextual analysis123 before going on to show how the judicial 
rules about rulemaking have contributed to the rise of presidential direct ac-
tion.124 I also have taken a progressive textual approach to analyzing the 
courts’ practice of giving superdeference to the military,125 the waiver of sov-
ereign immunity in section 702 of the APA,126 and the D.C. Circuit’s imposi-
tion of rulemaking procedures on agency shifts in the interpretation of their 
own regulations.127 
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Aram Gavoor and Steven Platt surveyed the APA’s text, structure, and 
history to conclude that the administrative record in judicial review “should 
include only those materials that individuals working on the decision actual-
ly and directly considered.”128 In a testament to the value of this sort of work, 
Justice Thomas cited Gavoor and Platt’s article in his opinion in Department 
of Commerce v. New York.129 Notably, although their work attracted the at-
tention of a conservative justice, their mode of analysis was progressive, and 
they emphasized progressive values. Among other things, they argued that 
misinterpreting the phrase “whole record” in the APA “wastes resources and 
shifts expenditure[s] away from core agency functions”; takes a “toll” on 
agencies and agency employees, as well as challengers and the courts; and 
“might contribute to the erosion of the arbitrary and capricious standard.”130 
III. MOVING FORWARD 
A progressive textual analysis of the APA will not answer every question 
of administrative law. The APA is often silent on pressing issues.131 Indeed, 
in many ways, the APA is now woefully out of date and cannot possibly ad-
dress the challenges of the modern administrative state.132 This led Gillian 
Metzger to observe that administrative common law—that is, judicial rules 
that “venture too far afield from statutory text or discernable legislative pur-
pose to count simply as statutory interpretation”133—“cannot be discarded 
because it plays too important a role in enabling the courts to navigate the 
challenges of modern administrative government under our constitutional 
separation of powers system.”134 
Regardless of whether Metzger is correct, the text must be the starting 
point. The exceptional legislative effort that led to the APA should have con-
sequences, among them that any interpretation of the Act “must stay within 
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the boundaries of the text that Congress enacted.”135 In the very least, the 
text might “narrow the range of possible outcomes.”136 Too often, scholars 
dispute the underlying principles before analyzing the APA itself. A proper 
progressive textual analysis takes time and effort and often is unavailing. But 
we should take the time to examine the APA closely before jumping to the 
conclusion that the text has nothing to tell us.137 
Ultimately, however, progressive administrative law scholars must ad-
dress the principles underlying the APA. When the text does not provide a 
clear answer, interpretation depends on those underlying principles.138 Jef-
frey Rosen cautioned that “the new textualism may provide a useful rhetori-
cal framework for liberal[s] . . . to pursue their substantive goals, but it’s no 
substitute for the substantive goals themselves.”139 Nonetheless, if we are to 
use the APA to advance progressive principles in administrative law, we 
need “more articles that seek to elucidate the meaning of important [APA] 
provisions that remain shrouded in mystery or obscured by current doc-
trine.”140 
CONCLUSION 
Progressive administrative law scholars should claim the APA as a doc-
ument that reflects a progressive history, progressive inspiration, and pro-
gressive development over time. To do that, we should follow our colleagues 
in constitutional law who have appropriated textualism and shaped it into a 
progressive mode of analysis. 
This brings us back to The Procedure Fetish. Employing a progressive 
textualist approach to interpreting the APA should lead us to do as Bagley 
suggests: lighten the procedural load on federal agencies. The APA’s text im-
poses only modest procedural burdens, leaving the bulk of procedural design 
to agency discretion. The history and context surrounding that text includes 
the progressive movements that inspired the creation of many federal agen-
cies in the first place. Among the goals of progressive administrative law 
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scholarship should be freeing agencies to pursue the progressive ends for 
which they were established. As Bagley prescribes, we should approach pro-
cedure with caution and be sure that the increased burden does not under-
mine the achievement of progressive statutory goals. 
